Devaluation and crises in emerging economies have tended to be followed by an outright economic collapse. This post-devaluation economic contraction is inconsistent with the conventional view that devaluation is expansionary/inflationary and needs to be accompanied by demand deflationary monetary and fiscal policy. This paper undertakes a detailed empirical analysis to determine whether real devaluation is contractionary rather than expansionary in the case of Thailand, which was the "trigger" country in the East Asian crisis of 1997-98.
I. Introduction
An orthodox policy prescription in response to a financial crisis is that of a competitive devaluation. Yet, this panacea has been heavily criticized not just by the financial press and regional political leaders but also by the central banking community. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, with the benefit of hindsight, even some Fund economists (Boorman et al. 2000, p. 6 ) have admitted that:
[i]t was ... not foreseen at the outset that these economies would adjust in a dysfunctional way of reduced external financing -largely through a collapse of private domestic demand rather than a boom in exports. This adjustment reflected in large part the harsh balance-sheet effects of the currency depreciations that occurred, given the unhedged foreign currency exposures of banks and corporations.
Indeed, the reality of this inconsistency was borne out in the way events played out in Thailand, the country widely viewed as the genesis of the 1997-98 crisis. The Thai scenario was characterized by the sterilization of reserve outflows by the Bank of Thailand (BOT), so as to ensure the smooth growth of money supply over the crisis period (World Bank 1999) . As a result, despite the fall in reserves due to the crisis, the monetary base sharply increased over the period. As clearly evidenced in Figures 1 and 2 , which respectively track the international reserve position and money supply of Thailand over the pre-to post-crisis period, the initial decline in reserves was accompanied by a concomitant rise in domestic credit.1 Aug -1995Aug-1997Aug-1999Aug-2001Aug-2003 ----------Money (M1 However, the unsustainability of such a strategy was succinctly captured by Maclntyre (1999, p. 14) : [a] side effect of injecting large scale emergency funding into the ... failing finance companies was blowing out the money supply.... This served to sharpen the fundamental contradiction in the government's overall macroeconomic position. At the same time as it was pumping money into insolvent finance companies to keep them afloat, the central bank was also spending down reserves to prop up the exchange rate ...
[T]his
was not a sustainable strategy.
Why, then, did Thailand choose to pursue such a course of action? To understand this, one needs to recognize the moral hazard problem facing entrepreneurial activity in developing countries.
Since informational asymmetry surrounding these projects effectively impose an upper ceiling on investment vis-à-vis the full-information outcome, investment financing in most developing economies is largely dependent on bank lending.
Thailand is no exception. As illustrated in Table 1 , bank credit constitutes the overwhelming majority of financing activity.2 It was believed, therefore, that any sustained fall in bank lending would have led to detrimental spillover effects on real economic activity. As such, it was no surprise that, in the event of crisis, the BOT chose to support domestic financial institutions through a major liquidity injection (Table 2) .
Nonetheless, in spite of the fairly supportive macroeconomic policy pursued by the Thai authorities over the crisis episode (Boorman et al. 2000; Lane et al. 1999) , output in Thailand fell sharply in the interim. With regard to monetary policy, the hesitation of the Thai central bank to adopt the conventional response of raising interest rates at the onset of the crisis arguably led to a deeper crisis.3 Furthermore, fiscal policy was also largely in line with supporting the flagging economy; the sustained fiscal deficit of the Thai Government post-1996 attests to this fact (IMF 2000ft).4 These factors suggest that the effect of devaluation, far from being expansionary, might instead have been contractionary. For the case of Thailand, the supposed boost to competitiveness that would accrue from currency devaluation clearly failed to materialize, and any stimulus to real economic activity, if at all, only manifested itself after a significant lag. In the words of Dooley and Walsh (1999, p. 3), "[w]e are ... unsure why some crises are followed by ... economic recession while others are not". This apparent failure in the standard policy prescription, together with the ambiguity surrounding Note: a. Assets of banks as a percent of the assets of banks and non-bank financial institutions. Sources: Compiled from various sources. the existing theoretical literature, form the basis for the motivation for this present paper: to empirically examine the case for or against currency devaluation. In particular, the study will apply a range of econometric tests to study the post-devaluation output collapse in Thailand, the "trigger" country in the Asian financial crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. In the two sections that follow, the economics that underlie currency devaluation is briefly reviewed, and, in light of this literature, a heuristic review of the data, with an emphasis on capital flow dynamics, is attempted. This is followed by a detailed empirical investigation of the impact of real exchange depreciation on Thai output, before a final section concludes the paper.
II. The Economics of Currency Devaluation5
Despite the importance of the subject matter, economic theory offers little by way of resolution of the conundrum surrounding an appropriate response to a financial crisis. The conventional view, adhered to by the majority of economists (and standard fare in international economics texts),6
remains that devaluations are a key component of a post-crisis stabilization programme. According to this view, assuming that the economy is not at full employment, devaluations motivate expenditure switching, which in turn spurs tradables production (and, by extension, exports) . This adjustment process results in a strengthening of the country's external balance.
However, a trade-off this entails might be a negative impact of the devaluation on total output. This contrarian school of thought, which has come to be known as the "contractionary devaluation critique" (Edwards 1986) , argues that there are at two main channels by which this may occur.
Devaluations may squeeze aggregate demand, through either a negative wealth effect due to inflationary pressures, or income redistribution from savers to dissavers, or a deterioration in the trade balance (Frenkel and Johnson 1976; Krugman and Taylor 1978) . Alternatively, devaluations may induce a leftward shift in aggregate supply due to the expenditure reducing effect dominating the expenditure switching effect; this would likewise generate recessionary results (van Wijnbergen 1986) .7
Among the many channels proposed in the contractionary devaluation literature, of particular interest to the Asian episode is the balance sheet effect, or the so-called double mismatch, of unhedged short-term foreign currency denominated debt financing long-term repayments (Krugman 2000; Mishkin 1998 ).
More formally, Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000) show, within a similar monetary framework, how there exists a tension between the two competing effects of raising domestic nominal interest rates post crisis: an increase in the debt burden faced by domestic firms, on one hand, and 
where D and Dc are the firms' borrowing and constrained borrowing, P is the price level, and rg is the real interest rate on domestic debt, s and µ are parameters, the first of which scales an (assumed) linear production technology and the second being the proportionality factor for entrepreneurs' wealth. In equilibrium, it is possible to show that it is optimal to increase the interest rate / when
Therefore, depending on the values that, in particular, µ'(?{) and (D1 -Dc) take on, the optimal policy response to a currency crisis is indeterminate.
Extending this line of analysis, Krugman (2000) has shown that for small variations in the exchange rate, the pro-competitive effects of a devaluation will dominate, resulting in the devaluation being expansionary; whereas for large deviations, balance sheet effects dominate, leading to output contraction. However, since such models are typically characterized by multiple equilibria, a conundrum arises -even a seemingly small devaluation might possibly lead to sharp capital outflows and outright collapse, as the economy moves from one equilibrium to another.9
The emerging market crises of the 1990s have been distinguished by a set of striking empirical regularities; so much so that these have come to be known as the stylized facts of "sudden stops".10 Although the theoretical literature in this area is in its nascent stages, most studies attempt to rationalize the phenomenon within a partial equilibrium framework, and are premised on the existence of financial frictions. One class of models is driven by the debtor's ability to pay, usually through the imposition of a collateral constraint, while another class focuses on the debtor's willingness to pay.11
More recently, Arellano and Mendoza (2003) have embedded the basic ideas of these models into an equilibrium business cycle framework with financial frictions. Although the aim of these papers are to explain the conditions that generate sudden stops, work within this vein provide an early, if not crude, understanding of the macroeconomic consequences faced by countries that are subject to and are undergoing recovery from a financial crisis.
III. Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Consequences in Thailand: A Quick Review
The data on capital flows in Thailand provide some insight surrounding the events immediately prior to and following the crisis. Table 3 captures the private capital flows data between 1997 and 1999, based on data reported by the BOT.
Immediately obvious is the fact that, just prior to devaluation in the first quarter of 1997, both the bank and non-bank sectors experienced capital outflows.12 This is a reflection of the general loss of confidence that precipitated in the severe pressure faced by the baht in February, although this did not lead to formal devaluation.
Some explanatory notes will better capture the flow dynamics of the period. First, funds continued to flow into the country during the first half of 1997,right up to devaluation in July. Indeed, it was only after the devaluation that there was a massive exodus of these banking sector flows. Furthermore, foreign direct investment (FDI) actually rose in 1998,somewhat offsetting the drastic declines in portfolio capital and non-resident baht accounts (NRBAs) , and leading to a relatively small deterioration in the non-bank capital account.
Second, portfolio flows experienced a directional Bank5, [3] [4] [5] 0521, 401 of which Recapitalization0 0 2,2912,58846722184 BIBFs4,584-505-9,451-9,352-4,010-1,296-1,489 Non-bank13,198-1,906-2,760-2,924-3,164-2,076-7,421 Direct investment1,4553,1805 ,0193,2182 ,7613,588829 Foreign direct investment2,2713 ,6275,1433 Total18, 7704, 509 change in November and December 1997, leading to a sharp decrease in portfolio investment in 1998. between 1991 and 1994, more or less stagnated in 1997 before collapsing to -10 per cent in 1998. This episode naturally begs an empirical investigation that will formally examine exactly how (or whether) devaluations might (or did) lead to a real economic contraction. Since Thailand was the "trigger" country for the Asian financial crisis, it seems a natural starting point to flesh out the informal arguments made above with careful empirical testing.
IV. Empirical Analysis
The broad story of original "crisis" leading to devaluation and resulting financial and economic "collapse" is shared by Mexico in 1994 and 1995 . Thus Montiel (1999 rightly concludes that "(t)he upshot is that the similarities between Mexico and Thailand mattered much more than the differences, and the policy message from the two experiences is the same" (p. 41). Kamin and Rogers (2000) investigate the impact of Mexico's real exchange rate on domestic output using a VAR (vector autoregression) model. Motivated by their paper, in this section we attempt to uncover the reasons for the underlying post-devaluation economic collapse, and more specifically, the output effects (if any) of real exchange rate depreciations in Thailand.13
IVl. Data Preliminaries Figure 4 plots Thailand's real effective exchange rate (REER) against the seasonally adjusted real GDP Two important observations bear noting.
First, the REER and output variables appear to have little if any co-movement prior to the crisis period (before mid-1996) . To be specific, output was on a rapidly rising trend, peaking in mid-1996.14 Before the crisis and devaluation, Thailand, as with most other Southeast Asian economies, maintained a de facto U.S. dollar peg despite the importance of trade and investment linkages with Japan (Frankel and Wei 1994; McKinnon 2000) . As 
IV.2. Methodology
The empirics in this section involve three specific tests. We begin with a simple correlation test which provides an indication of the degree of correlation between the REER and real output (real seasonally adjusted GDP) in the short term. Of course, even if causation exists, correlation could run both ways. We therefore conduct a pair-wise Granger-causality test to determine the temporal ordering of the two variables. However, both these tests are bivariate ones, with well-known limitations. Therefore, as a third step, we estimate a vector error correction (VEC) model to establish medium to long-term interdependence between real exchange rate and output in Thailand.15 Additionally, in a VAR framework, external shocks and the degree of interactions between variables can be detected through both impulse reaction functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition techniques.
IV.3. Bivariate Tests
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the two bivariate tests at their first difference. We see that there is a positive nexus between the REER and real output variables in Thailand over the whole sample period as well as the second sub-period (Table 5) , while a negative relationship is seen for the first sub-period. However, the degree of these correlations is not very strong: about 0.1 for the whole period and the second sub-period, and -0. 1 for the first sub-period. To a very limited extent, though, the positive correlation in the second subperiod is again suggestive that a real devaluation (fall in REER) is accompanied by a drop in output. The pair-wise Granger causality on the entire sample period reveals that variations in the REER preceded output fluctuations, not vice versa, and that this relationship is significant (Table 6 ).
Moreover, while no Granger causality exists in the first sub-period, the precedence of the REER to GDP is weakly significant in the second subperiod. This again supports the notion that a real exchange rate devaluation is a significant contributing factor to an output contraction. Since most of the series in this study are found to be 1(1) and co-integrating relationships do exist, the application of the VEC model is appropriate.18 We find that there exists more than one integrating vector in the whole sample period and the second sub-period, while only one integrating vector can be found under the first sub-period.
IV.4. VAR Model
VEC model. The VEC model is a restricted VAR designed for use with non-stationary series that are known to be cointegrated. A virtue of the VEC model is its specification, which restricts the longrun behaviour of the endogenous variables from converging to their cointegration relationships, yet allowing for a wide range of short-run dynamics.19 As illustrated by Kamin and Rogers (2000, p. 107) , it is possible to reduce a full system of all prominent channels of causality linking output to the real exchange rate to a relatively tractable system of four key equations. The analysis here draws on the benchmark theoretical model of Kamin and Rogers (2000) and adapts it to the case of Thailand. The first difference of each endogenous variable is regressed on a one period lag of the cointegrating equation(s) and lagged first differences of all the endogenous variables in the system. Since each expression on the right-hand side of (4) As with a VAR model, it is difficult to interpret the coefficients intuitively in the VEC model as the estimated coefficients of the regression equations contain complicated cross-equation feedbacks. Therefore, in order to draw conclusions, it is preferable to analyse the system's reaction to typical random shocks using the techniques of impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decompositions (VDCs). VDCs determine the proportion of each variable's shock that is attributable to each of the innovations in the model, while the IRFs trace out the dynamic responses of each variable to an innovation in a particular variable.
Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions. Table 9 and Figures 5 to 7 present the variance decompositions of the REER and the real GDP variables for the whole sample period and the two sub-periods, respectively. Table 9 First, the predominant source of variation in REER forecast errors are "own shocks" to REER -these generally account for 90 per cent for lags of two periods, and not less than 70 per cent on the lags of five and ten periods, for all sample periods. Most other variables account for about only 1 per cent of the forecast errors in the REER on the lagged two period in all sample periods.
Second, and in some contrast to the first result, accounting for the effects of "own shocks" to the real GDP renders the REER as the second most important source of variation in GDP, for both the whole and first sub-period. However, the REER effects on output are not valid for the second sub-period.
Third, an additional interesting point for the first sub-period (Table 9 and Figure 5 ) is that the output variance due to an REER shock declines as the period increases, suggesting that the REER has a short-term lagged effect on output. On the other hand, output variance due to the own shock effect increases.
To sum up, the preceding results indicate that shocks on REER due to the variation of real GDP occur in all sample periods, but not vice versa. The impact of the REER variations on output tends to decrease over time. This may imply that the REER has only a short-term lagged effect on output. However, it is unclear as to whether REER shocks affect output positively or negatively. This question will be explored further by examinations of the IRFs.
Figures 8 to 10 respectively report the IRFs in the whole sample period as well as the two sub-periods. The results are consistent with the VDCs, that is, output variance is impacted by a REER shock and the impact declines over time.
Two additional points of interest emerge from examination of the IRFs. One, the REER was positively related to output for the whole sample period and in the second sub-period. Thus a negative shock to the REER (devaluation) can cause the output to decline, confirming the simple bivariate correlation test results. Two, the first sub-period, which represents the pre-devaluation period, shows that REER and output variables are in turn negatively related to each other. This may be consistent with Krugman (2000) , who has suggested that a crisis-induced or large devaluation could be contractionary (i.e., the REER and output variables both decline), but a "small" real devaluation is expansionary.
V. Conclusion
The conventional view is that devaluation is expansionary/inflationary and needs to be accompanied by demand deflationary monetary and fiscal policy. However, the devaluation of the Thai baht has been associated with a temporary but sharp recession. Analysis of the Thai example suggests that devaluation may have contributed to capital outflows and that it was the associated loss of liquidity that both directly and indirectly caused a recession. Detailed empirical analysis in this paper confirms the belief that a real devaluation in Thailand during the crisis period was contractionary. It also finds that long-term co-movement exists between the real exchange rate and output. The results further indicate the effects of a real devaluation shock on output declines as the lagged period increases, suggesting only a short-term lagged impact of real exchange rate variations on output.
While the empirical results are too tentative to draw firm policy lessons, the analysis does suggest the importance of considering the effects of devaluation on the response of capital markets when macroeconomic policies are designed during financial crises. After all, the restoration of "market confidence" has been among the stated goals of IMF conditionality during the crisis in East Asia Notes: All data are from the CEIC database. Data for government expenditure, money supply, and GDP were obtained in index form. GDP was adjusted for seasonal effects, and monthly GDP data were interpolations of quarterly data.
NOTES
The authors wish to thank Ramkishen Rajan, who provided much of the inspiration and advice for the theoretical analyses that the paper was based. All remaining errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors. 1.A broadly similar description seems to hold for Mexico. Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and Flood, Garber, and Kramer (1996) both develop extensions of the standard Krugman (1979) ex ante monetary disequilibrium model that rationalize particular aspects of the Mexican crisis. Rajan (2001) does the same for the case of Thailand, while Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) attempt to place the Asian case in the context of a model that considers the transmission mechanism. Clearly, an ex post monetary disequilibrium model, à la Obstfeld (1986) , cannot be ruled out a priori either.
2.Note also how the data for other regional economies display similar patterns. This implies the distinct possibility that similar policy motivations exist for such a devaluation strategy in these other Asian crisis-struck countries. 3.In particular, arguments have been forwarded that this ambivalence in policy stance has led to a mitigation of the positive effects of IMF crisis lending and has further served to undermine the credibility of the fundsupported programme. However, one should note the experience of Indonesia, which did raise interest rates in response but subsequently fell into a deeper crisis than Thailand. 4. Boorman et al. (2000) ask the question, "did the tighter initial stance on fiscal policy have a negative effect on economic activity that persisted even though the initial tightening was unwound"? While they acknowledge that this is "difficult to answer with available data", they go on to note that, "(i) in the case of Thailand ... the program was introduced in August 1997 and, at the first quarterly review in November, as early projections suggested underperformance with regard to the initial fiscal targets, additional measures were introduced with a view to achieving the original targets. The latter further tightening of policies -intended at the time to avoid shaking confidence by weakening fiscal targets at the time of accession of a new government -was, in hindsight, mistaken; it delayed the easing of fiscal policy until about six months into the program" (p. 51). 5.This section draws in part from the work of Rajan (2001) and Rajan and Bird (2002) .
6.Possibly the earliest exposition of this view -albeit in a closed-economy context -is that of Bagehot (1873) .
A standard textbook exposition is that of Dornbusch (1988) or Mundell (1968, pp. 152-76) . 7.In terms of practical policy-making, Taylor (1981) provides a critique of the standard IMF prescription, arguing that such programmes were in fact stagflationary. Edwards puts the data to the test and concludes that, for his analysis of twelve developing economies for the period 1965-80, that real devaluations have a small contractionary effect in the short-run but are neutral in the long-run. However, in a later survey, Kamin (1988) concludes that there existed insufficient empirical evidence to support the claim that devaluation, per se, was contractionary.
8.For the full derivation of these equations and those following, see the original paper by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000).
9.As Calvo (1996, p. 219) has noted, "if there is a 'bad' equilibrium lurking in the background, a devaluationespecially, an unscheduled devaluation -could coordinate expectations and help push the economy to the 'bad' equilibrium".
10.The term "sudden stops" was first coined by Calvo (1998) . These empirical regularities include, inter alia, a major reversal of the current account deficit; sharp corrections in asset prices; a collapse of aggregate demand and production; and the loss of access to international financial markets (Arellano and Mendoza 2003) . 1 1 . Examples in each category are the papers by Edison, Luangaram, and Miller (2000) , Kletzer and Wright (2000) , and Wright (2001) .
12.In particular, outflows were recorded in non-resident baht accounts (NRBAs) as well as the "other loans" component. NRBAs are essentially Nostro accounts, held in domestic banks, serving primarily the transactions of foreign parties. These include, for example, baht clearing for foreign currency-related transactions and stock market transactions by foreigners. 13. Rajan and Bird (2002) also explore the case of Thailand as the "trigger" country in the Asian financial crisis, although their analytical case study methodology differs from the approach presented in the present paper. Rajan and Shen (2002) have also attempted to explain the phenomenon of post-crisis economic contraction by deploying a two-step econometric model. 14.Indeed, Thailand was among the world's fastest growing economies before the crisis hit. 15. Kamin and Rogers (2000) briefly review the few available papers using VAR models to determine the nexus between real exchange rates and output. 16.See Sims (1980 and 1982) ; also see Cooley and LeRoy (1985) for an important critique. 17.The main argument against differencing is that it may not able to capture the information concerning the co-movements in the data. However Doan (1992) cautions against differencing even if the variables contain a unit root. He argues that the goal of VAR analysis is to determine the inter-relationship among the variables, not the parameter estimates.
18.Conventional VAR models with data in levels have also been estimated over all sample periods. The results of the models in level over different sample periods are qualitatively similar and are available from the authors on request.
19.See Enders (1995) for details on the VEC model.
20
.Alternative models with different lag structures were also tested, and the results were qualitatively similar. In each case, the results remained robust to different lag length pairs. Overall, there appears to be little or no feedback from lags of more than four periods, hence the final specification. 21.We also examined models with exogenous variables (i.e. U.S. interest rate and capital account). The results are unaffected by the exogenous variables, and so we do not report them. For completeness, note that both variables were found to be 1(0). 22.For example, the first row can be written as (p, , ? , , + tt,. ? " , + ... + p, ? ,). Since each series ? .is 23.See for instance, Krug"man (1998), Mussa (1999), and Rodri'k (1999) .
